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LOCKE’S THEORY OF INTOLERANCE 
Jennifer Biess 
Although John Locke is one of liberalism’s founding theorists, his theory of toleration is not 
as liberal as one might expect. His philosophy is limited by the negative character of his argument 
and his allowance for the exclusion of certain groups, which render his version of toleration 
indefensible if the ultimate goal is to promote a truly liberal theory of toleration. 
 According to Jeremy Waldron, an argument for toleration is “an argument which gives a 
reason for not interfering with a person’s beliefs or practices even when we have reason to hold 
that those beliefs or practices are mistaken.”1  Locke’s argument for toleration is limited by its 
negative viewpoint, which only approaches toleration from the perspective of the persecutor, not 
the victim.  Locke founds his argument on the irrationality of using coercion to change beliefs, 
claiming that coercion only acts on the will and that belief is not subject to the will.  These beliefs 
should instead be swayed by education and argument.  If beliefs are not subject to the will, the 
means, using coercion, do not suit the ends, changing beliefs.2  Locke defines toleration as “nothing 
but the absence of force deployed for religious ends,” which emphasizes the means versus ends 
nature of his theory3.  This argument, which focuses on rationality, is a pragmatic argument rather 
than a principled one.  Waldron comments, “What one misses… is a sense that there is anything 
morally wrong with intolerance, or a sense of deep concern for the victims of persecution.”4  
Without this moral factor, Locke’s theory only explains why using coercion does not make sense 
and fails to provide a principled argument for why it is wrong, which should be an essential 
component of any defensible theory of toleration. 
 However, Alex Tuckness argues that Locke’s rationality approach implies a more 
principled argument than Waldron acknowledges.  Locke allows for intolerance that is “necessary 
to the preservation of civil society.”5  For example, the toleration of crime and acts that harm others 
he argues are to the detriment of civil society.  Although this seems open to abuse, Tuckness 
argues that Locke intends for magistrates to only act in ways that they would want other 
magistrates to act, since their actions could be used as a precedent.  Considering that everyone is 
fallible, magistrates will be more stringent in when to be intolerant.6  Thus, Tuckness extends 
Locke’s characteristic appeal to reason to provide a more principled view of the extent of the 
magistrate’s toleration.   
 But Locke’s rationality argument is not against coercion in general; he is only against 
“coercion undertaken for certain reasons.”7  Locke uses the example of a magistrate prohibiting the 
slaughter of calves when discussing the magistrate’s inability to restrict or impose religious rites.8   
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It would be irrational for the magistrate to ban the slaughter of calves, if his intent was to impact 
religious belief; however, if he is motivated by economic concerns the ban would be rational, even 
if it discriminates against groups unequally.9  Thus, Locke’s view of toleration implicitly allows for 
discriminatory effects, which further limits Locke’s concept of toleration. 
    Furthermore, Locke’s theory of toleration is not defensible because it allows for exclusion 
of certain groups, which makes it inherently intolerant. When Locke says, “That church can have 
no right to be tolerated…that all those who enter into it…deliver themselves up to the protection 
and service of another prince,” he is referencing the allegiance of Catholics to the Pope, which 
incorporates intolerance of Catholics into his theory.10  Anthony Marx comments, “Locke’s 
proclamation of tolerance thus implicitly excluded the one group arguably most needing 
tolerance.”11  Locke’s toleration only really promoted tolerance between the various Protestant 
sects, while excluding those who, in a Protestant state, truly needed tolerance, the Catholics. Since 
Locke’s theory accommodates this substantial intolerance, it cannot be viewed as a viable theory of 
toleration. 
 However, the exclusion of certain groups plays an important role: building national unity.  
According to Marx national unity is essential to the creation of democracy.12  The Protestant 
English rallied around their joint exclusion of Catholics to create the national cohesion necessary 
for England to become a democracy.  Marx comments, “Locke apparently justified an exception to 
the separation of church and state when it came to excluding Papists… in order to protect the state, 
preserve national unity and the social order, and make liberal democracy possible.13  Thus, 
exclusion of certain groups, while intolerant, could be seen as applicable in terms of building new 
liberal democracies.  Because of this caveat, Locke’s theory could be seen as a more viable option in 
more traditional societies, but not a developed society such as the United States today. 
 Even if Locke’s theory of toleration has some practical value in this respect, it is still 
inherently intolerant, which makes it indefensible.  Its built-in intolerance goes against the core 
principle of liberalism as identified by Judith Shklar.  Shklar states, “Every adult should be able to 
make as many effective decisions without fear or favor about as many aspects of her or his life as is 
compatible with the like freedom of every other adult.  That belief is the original and only 
defensible meaning of liberalism.”14  The intolerance of Catholics as promoted by Locke’s theory 
allows for unequal treatment of Catholics and Protestants. Marx outlines how anti-Catholic 
discrimination continued until relatively recently in England’s history. The Catholic Emancipation 
Act was not passed until 1892 and even after that Catholics did not enjoy equal rights.15  This 
historical evidence makes clear how the exclusion of certain groups for which Locke allows creates 
and perpetuates inequality, which is not only intolerant, but illiberal, and cannot be defensible.   
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